More TSA Thoughts
As I went through security at Detroit Metro today, I observed a TSA agent trying to persuade a crying four year-old boy to relinquish his blanket in order to run it through the the X-Ray machine. The boy obviously didn't like the ideal of sending it into a machine from which it might not return. In the several minutes it took to get the boy's blanket into the machine, I wondered why the agent didn't perform a manual inspection of the blanket. After all, it's rather difficult to conceal a useful weapon in a three-by-three section of fleece.
As I got to thinking about the state of affairs at TSA, I came upon the realization that the TSA is the real-world equivalent of Norton Anti-Virus.
I'm not suggesting that we don't need security screening, but I believe that it should be done intelligently. Short of draconian measures that nobody would accept (people flying naked while handcuffed to their seats), there is no way to prevent a serious attack by trained individuals. The cheapest way to prevent another 9/11 is to eliminate air travel -- and that's just not acceptable either. If we know that TSA can only be an 80% solution, than we should set its security measures appropriately. Trying to make TSA a 95% solution would be a cost-prohibitive, frustrating, and useless exercise.
In the meantime, let's realize that bottled water, soda, shampoo, lipstick, and baby blankets are not serious security threats. Reacting knee-jerk to every remotely possible threat that comes along is not productive. The "liquid bomb" threat was not prevented by the wonderful TSA, but instead was handled by people who work out of the limelight and proactively prevent terrorist attacks to this country.
As I got to thinking about the state of affairs at TSA, I came upon the realization that the TSA is the real-world equivalent of Norton Anti-Virus.
- They both protect against outdated or low-level threats.
- They both are ineffective against a smart and determined attacker.
- They both are a constant annoyance, and always to try remind you of how good a job they are doing.
- They both serve primarily as a soothing antidote to the masses, making people think that they are secure even if they are not.
- They both consume excessive amounts of resources.
- They both are exceedingly difficult to uninstall and remove.
I'm not suggesting that we don't need security screening, but I believe that it should be done intelligently. Short of draconian measures that nobody would accept (people flying naked while handcuffed to their seats), there is no way to prevent a serious attack by trained individuals. The cheapest way to prevent another 9/11 is to eliminate air travel -- and that's just not acceptable either. If we know that TSA can only be an 80% solution, than we should set its security measures appropriately. Trying to make TSA a 95% solution would be a cost-prohibitive, frustrating, and useless exercise.
In the meantime, let's realize that bottled water, soda, shampoo, lipstick, and baby blankets are not serious security threats. Reacting knee-jerk to every remotely possible threat that comes along is not productive. The "liquid bomb" threat was not prevented by the wonderful TSA, but instead was handled by people who work out of the limelight and proactively prevent terrorist attacks to this country.
posted by David at 10/01/2006 09:03:00 PM
1 Comments:
That's a pretty good analogy.
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